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Introduction
The conflict between honoring public debt commitments and alleviating the lot of the poor is a recurrent topic among social policy activists and left-wing politicians in the developing world.
For instance, at the World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre in 2002, participants observed that external debt payments absorb a substantial amount of resources and that poor developing countries should stop repaying their debt. Funds previously earmarked for debt repayment should be redirected to finance "socially just and ecologically sustainable development" (Toussaint and Zacharie, 2002) . Debt relief, either granted by the lenders or obtained unilaterally through outright default, is often seen as an expeditious way to raise social public expenditure and improve the welfare of the poor. As argued by the World Bank and the IMF in support of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, debt "relief can also be used to free up resources for higher social spending aimed at poverty reduction to the extent that cash debtservice payments are reduced."
2 Jeffrey Sachs has gone even further: "No civilized country should try to collect the debts of people that are dying of hunger and disease and poverty." These arguments resonate strongly in Latin America, where interest debt payments absorb on average 2.8 percent of GDP, which would be enough to increase total social expenditures by 25 percent. 4 Considering the attention that this issue attracts in the public debate, it is striking how little empirical research has been devoted to assessing whether countries burdened with heavier debt commitments do indeed spend less in the social sectors. A few studies have been concerned with the factors that may influence social expenditure levels, and more specifically, the possible impact of fiscal adjustment measures on social expenditure. For instance, Hicks and Kubisch (1984) and Hicks (1989) found that social expenditures tended to be well-protected in a small sample of highly indebted countries during periods of fiscal retrenchment in the 1970s and early 1980s, a finding that is confirmed by Baqir (2002) with a panel of over 100 countries for the period 1985-1998.
Another topic of study has been the influence of institutional and political variables in social expenditure, which is the focus of the paper by Baqir. His main conclusion is that democratization tends to be followed by important increases in social expenditure, a stylized fact that reflects the Latin American experience, where the wave of democratizations that took place in the 1980s was followed by an important increase in social expenditures, from a median of 7.7 percent of GDP in 1990 to 11.4 percent in 2003. 5 Other authors who have explored how public expenditures may be affected by institutional and political variables have concluded that corruption reduces the share of education expenditures in total expenditures (Mauro, 1998) and that education and health expenditures grow faster in more democratic countries (Snyder and Yackovlev, 2000) .
In a related branch of the literature, several studies have analyzed how the economic or the functional categories of public spending may be affected when total expenditure is reduced.
For instance, Heller and Diamond (1990) found that the most common shift in spending patterns among a large number of developing countries during the 1975-86 period was away from fixed assets and capital transfers and toward interest, subsidy and transfer payments. Using a sample of 25 countries from 1972 from to 1988 from , Papagitos (1992 concluded that stabilization programs do not shift public expenditure away from "growth-augmenting areas," a concept that includes education and health expenditures.
Nonetheless, while fiscal adjustment or public expenditure reductions may be aimed at honoring debt obligations, these studies do not shed enough light on the impact that debt and debt service payments may have on the level of social expenditures or their share in total expenditures. Mahdavi (2004) is the only author who has attempted to assess how the external debt burden may influence the composition of government spending by economic categories.
Using a sample of 47 countries for 1972-2001, Mahdavi finds support for the adverse effect of the debt burden on capital expenditure, and on current expenditures other than wages and salaries. Since a large part of social expenditure takes place in the form of wages and salaries paid to public servants in the education and health public sectors, this finding may suggest that social expenditures are shielded from the adverse effects of the debt burden. This would be consistent with previous findings on the resilience of this type of expenditures to fiscal adjustment measures.
However, this implication is not warranted, not only because the non-wage components of expenditure are important in some social sectors (health prevention and social protection 5 Data from ECLAC.
programs, for instance), but also because external debt is only a fraction of public debt: on average in Latin America, 22 percent of total public debt is held domestically, but in some countries that share is much higher and has been increasing recently.
Finally, a recent paper by Chauvin and Kraay (2005) has assessed the effects of debt relief on several economic and social variables, including public social expenditures. Using their own database measuring the present value of debt relief for 62 low-income countries between 1989 and 2003, they "find little evidence that debt relief has affected the level and composition of public spending in recipient countries."
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of total public debt (external and domestic) on social expenditure worldwide and in Latin America. More specifically, this paper addresses the following questions:
• Are social expenditures (as a share of GDP and as a share of total public expenditure)
affected by changes in public debt ratios (over GDP), and in what direction? • Is this effect due solely to the changes that occur in public debt service payments (as a share of GDP) when debt changes, or does the stock of debt have an effect of its own?
• Do different types of social expenditures (and more specifically, education and health expenditures) behave in the same way in response to changes in debt ratios or debt service payments?
• Does it make any difference if the lender is a multilateral organization, such as the International Monetary Fund, or a multilateral development bank?
• Does a debt default lead to an increase or a reduction in social expenditures?
• Do the answers to the previous questions hold for Latin America, or is the region different in any respect?
• And, finally, what are the policy implications of all of the above?
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to address these questions for a panel of countries. Our findings are striking. First and foremost, higher debt ratios do reduce social expenditures, as popular opinion holds. The largest and most robust part of this effect takes place directly from the stock of debt to social expenditures, which are more affected than other expenditures when debt increases. Surprisingly, increases in debt service payments (which may be the result of higher debt ratios) produce only a minor and non-significant effect on social expenditures. This clearly suggests that debt displaces social expenditures not so much because it raises the debt burden, but because it reduces the room (or the appetite) for further indebtedness.
Worldwide, both education and health expenditures are hit when debt increases but, proportional to the size of the expenditures, the impact is larger on health. Loans from official sources in general, and from the multilateral organizations in particular, do not seem to ameliorate the adverse consequences of debt on social expenditures. In accordance with popular wisdom, our results indicate that defaulting on debt obligations does help increase social expenditures (although our default measures may be somewhat imprecise). Finally, Latin America does seem to be different in several respects. The adverse effects of debt are significantly stronger in Latin America, especially in the health sectors. Social expenditures are also much more vulnerable in Latin America to increases in debt interest payments, which makes defaults more beneficial to social expenditures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the database and the econometric strategy. Section 3 discusses the main results worldwide before making any distinction between types of social expenditures or lender. These nuances are introduced in Section 4, where the possible effect of defaults is also addressed. Section 5 focuses on Latin America. Section 6 summarizes the results and offers some policy implications.
Data and Econometric Strategy
We use an unbalanced panel of up to 58 developing countries for the period 1985-2003 (in most regressions the sample is restricted to around 50 countries due to missing data for some of the explanatory variables, or to the breakup of social expenditures between education, health and other). The information for social government expenditures comes from a data set compiled by the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF. 6 As explained by Baqir (2002) Borensztein and Panizza (2006) . The main results are robust to changes in the method of estimation as shown in Table 4 .
Worldwide Results
Regressions 1 and 2 show that for fixed-effects OLS, the contemporary effect of debt stock changes on social expenditure is basically the same as obtained with the Arellano and Bond estimator. Taking the coefficients for the lagged dependent variable at face value, the long-run effect of debt would be substantially lower, but that is probably the result of biases in the estimation of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (which takes negative values).
Since the z-test in some of our basic regressions in Table 3 indicate the presence of autocorrelation of the residuals, in Regressions 3 and 4 of Table 4 we add to the list of regressors the second lag of the dependent variable, which produces only minor changes in the coefficients.
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The last two columns of Table 4 At this point, a short detour will shed some light on how the main fiscal variables react to changes in the stock of debt. Table 5 indicates that an increase of $1 in the stock of debt is associated with an increase of 4.9 cents in the primary balance and 1.3 cents in interest debt payments the following year (or 7 cents and 3.7 cents in the long run). The net effect on the overall fiscal balance is an increase of 2 cents in the short run or 3 cents in the long run (but these values are not statistically significant). The typical response that produces the improvement of the primary balance is a mix of higher revenues (2.6 cents in the following year or 3 cents in the long run) and lower expenditures (2.5 cents or 4.4 cents), but neither of them is estimated with precision.
In summary, and putting all the pieces together, following an increase in the stock of debt, governments worldwide typically react by reducing total expenditures and increasing total revenues by an amount beyond the increase in interest debt payments, thus in general tightening somewhat the overall fiscal balance. In this process, social expenditures are hit disproportionately hard, as they are sensitive not only to changes in total expenditures (and somewhat less to changes in revenues), but also to the direct impact of the stock of debt.
Previous literature has established that social expenditures are relatively more resilient than other expenditures during periods of fiscal retrenchment. Although our results do not contradict this conclusion in general, they do indicate that social expenditures are more directly sensitive to changes in the stocks of debt.
Although the reasons for the higher sensitivity of social expenditures to changes in the stock of debt should be a matter of further research, two hypotheses may be advanced. Before further elaborating on these basic findings, it is worth mentioning that the sensitivity of social expenditures to debt shocks is robust to the inclusion of other variables that might in principle affect social expenditures. All our regressions control for changes in log GDP and its squared (results not reported), which sometimes are significant, but excluding them from the regressions does not reduce the significance of the debt coefficient and barely changes any other result. We have also found that the results are unaltered by changes in inflation, the real exchange rate, the trade balance, imports or exports (results not shown). Furthermore, none of these variables is statistically significant. Table 6 replicates the basic regressions for the two main types of social expenditures: education and health. The results indicate that both types of expenditures react adversely to changes in the debt ratio. The coefficients in the regressions where the expenditures are measured as a share of GDP are highly significant and show little change when other fiscal variables are included as controls. When education and health are measured as shares of total expenditures, the coefficients are less stable, but are always negative and statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. With respect to the size of the debt coefficients, it is important to note that although those for education are larger than those for health in absolute values, the opposite is actually the case when the relative size of the sectors is taken into account. 11 Therefore, education expenditures are somewhat more shielded from the adverse effects of a debt shock. However, the difference is not statistically significant. Tables 7 and 8 provide a basis from which to discuss how, and if, the main conclusions of the previous section should be qualified considering the role of the official lenders, which include multilateral financial organizations, bilateral official lenders and the International
Some Extensions: By Sector, By Lender, and Defaults
Monetary Fund. The results of Table 7 indicate that total official debt has no additional effect on social expenditures. However, when separated by source, it becomes clear that different types of 11 On average in our sample, education expenditures are 1.87 times larger than health expenditures.
official lending have different effects on social expenditure. Bilateral lending and IMF lending, for example, are supportive of social expenditure. The positive coefficients in both cases roughly counteract the negative coefficient of public debt in general. This contrasts markedly with the effect of other multilateral debt, which further reduces social expenditure. Notice, however, that the negative effect of multilateral lending is somewhat weakened (but remains significant at the 10 percent level) when other fiscal variables are included in the regression. Notice also that when social expenditures are measured as shares of total revenues (not as shares of GDP), all types of official lending become insignificant. These results suggest that the different influence that each type of official lending has on social expenditures is due basically to how it influences total expenditures, rather than social expenditures directly. This is important to understand why non-IMF multilateral lending reinforces the adverse effects of debt, while bilateral and IMF lending ameliorates them. Table 8 attempts to shed some light on this. Official lending, in general, is associated with higher fiscal revenues and a stronger primary balance (both weakly significant), but is especially associated with lower interest payments (significant at 5 percent) and with a stronger overall fiscal balance (significant at 1 percent). 12 Differentiating by source, it becomes clear that while bilateral lending tends to increase total primary expenditures (more than offsetting the negative effect of public lending in general), IMF lending produces no discernible effect, while other multilateral lending reinforces the negative effect that public debt has on total primary expenditures. However, IMF lending is the only type of official lending that is associated with improvements in the primary balance, consistent with the role of this institution as an overseer of macroeconomic and fiscal stability. Interestingly, however, IMF lending seems to lead to higher interest payments, while multilateral lending is associated with substantially lower interest payments (500 basis points). When all these sources of fiscal change are combined, it turns out that only bilateral debt is associated with improvements in the overall fiscal balance. A word of caution is called for, however, since these estimates may be biased by the endogeneity of official lending in general, and IMF lending in particular. For instance, endogeneity may be the reason why IMF lending seems to lead to higher interest payments. 
Is Latin America Different?
Latin America is often associated with macroeconomic stability and debt crises. Since, as will be shown, social expenditures in Latin America are significantly below world patterns, it is worth discussing whether the links between debt and social expenditures are different in the region.
As a percentage of GDP, social expenditures in Latin America are 1.7 percent below the world pattern among developing countries (Table 10 , Regression 1). This gap is significant at a 1 percent level, and is calculated after controlling for income per capita and its square (although these controls are not significant). As shown in Regression 7, this difference can be explained by the fact that the developing countries of East Asia, Europe and Central Asia, and Africa that are included in the sample spend significantly more than Latin America. The bulk of the social expenditure gap is in the education sector, where the gap is 1.2 percent points of GDP (and takes into account the same groups of countries plus the Middle East and North Africa). However, when the analysis is based not on shares of GDP but on shares of total expenditure, social expenditure in Latin America turns out to be higher than world patterns. On average, Latin America devotes 6.2 percent more of the total (primary) budget to the social sectors than the rest of the developing world, and this difference is significant at the 5 percent level (Regression 4).
Of the 6.2 percent points, 3.3 go to health while the remainder goes to education. (However, by regions, the difference is only significant with respect to the Middle East and North Africa; see Regression 10.) Therefore, if the region spends too little in the social sectors it is only because the sizes of the governments are below world patterns.
Increases in debt stocks and in interest debt payments have much larger effects on social expenditures in Latin America than in the rest of the developing world, according to the results in Table 11 . The first regression indicates that when debt stocks increase by $1, social expenditures in Latin America decline 2.9 cents more than in other regions (where the decline is 1.1 cents). As indicated by Regression 2, the additional effect comes entirely from the increase in debt interest payments. For each additional dollar of debt payments, social expenditures in Latin America decline around 23 cents (while in the rest of the world they increase about 8 cents).
14 This result suggests that interest rates in Latin America are higher and more sensitive to debt shocks than in the rest of the developing world.
The higher sensitivity of social expenditures to interest payment shocks in Latin America is even more apparent when considering the share of social expenditures in total expenditures (Regressions 3 and 4 in Table 11 ). Social expenditures lose participation in a significant way when interest payments increase in Latin America (about 0.89 percent for each 1 percent increase in interest payments as a share of GDP). The share of the social sectors in total expenditure in Latin America is also significantly more sensitive to changes in primary expenditures.
The last two columns of Table 11 replicate the two basic regressions for the Latin American countries only, using information on social expenditures produced by ECLAC.
Although the limited sample restrains the use of this data set, the most important result is confirmed, namely, that social expenditures are sensitive to changes in public debt. The coefficient in Regression 5 is highly significant and larger than that obtained in our previous estimates for our full sample, indicating that social expenditures in Latin America are more sensitive to debt shocks. Regression 6 suggests that this effect takes place mainly through the influence of debt on primary expenditures. The coefficient for this variable is highly significant and around three times as large as that estimated for the whole sample. but takes a positive and significant value for Latin America, suggesting that the positive (average) effect of defaults on the level of social expenditure presented in a previous section is due to the Latin American countries. In Regressions 2 and 4, which control for the components of the fiscal balance, the default dummy coefficients-both for the whole sample and for Latin America-become insignificant, while the coefficient of interest debt payments in Latin America is negative and strongly significant, thus suggesting that the beneficial effect of defaults in the region is associated with the reallocation of funds previously destined to service the debt.
However, as Regressions 5 thru 8 consistently indicate, while defaults on average tend to raise the share of social expenditures in primary expenditures in the developing countries, the opposite occurs in Latin America. The adverse effect of defaults on the share of social expenditures in Latin America only becomes positive at high debt-to-GDP ratios (of around 50-60 percent, according to Regressions 5 and 6). Therefore, defaults do seem to raise social expenditures in Latin America, as lower interest payments "crowd in" primary expenditures; at high debt levels this effect tends to favor social sectors vis-à-vis other sectors.
Conclusions and Implications
Although the effects of public indebtedness on social expenditures is an issue of concern for politicians, social activists and the public at large, economists have basically disregarded the issue without much discussion of whether the various claims fit the facts or not. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to address some of the most basic questions related to the issue: Paradoxically as it may seem, these findings suggest that, at least in Latin America, orthodoxy in debt management is the best way to protect social expenditures. Consider the coefficients of Regression 3 in Table 3 and assume that the primary balance is at a level consistent with the stability of the debt ratio. 15 An improvement equivalent to 1 percent of GDP in the primary balance should initially cause a decline of social expenditures of 0.034 percent of GDP. However, this initial reduction is partially offset by an increase in social expenditures of 0.014 percent of GDP the following year, because the stock of debt has fallen. In the third year, the initial reduction would be fully offset, and beginning with the following year social expenditures would rise above the initial level. But the coefficients of Regression 4 indicate that it is possible to have social expenditure rising from the outset if the fiscal adjustment is based on an increase in revenues rather than on a reduction of expenditures, which is the reason why social expenditures fall in periods of fiscal retrenchment.
Our findings for the effects of defaults are also less supportive of heterodox actions than may seem at first sight. On average worldwide, social expenditures typically rise 0.4-0.5 percent of GDP the year after the declaration of a default (isolating the influence of lending from official sources). This is hardly a good business, since defaulters may end up paying a premium and facing much more restricted access to the credit markets, which may easily offset the beneficial effect. The conclusion is valid for Latin America also, because although the average effect is substantially larger (1.6 percent of GDP), 16 social expenditures in the region are much more sensitive to increases in debt interest payments.
Thus, the main policy conclusion of this paper is that the best way to protect social expenditure is to avoid overindebtedness. 4 3 Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc) 2.
1 All estimations are Arellano Bond in first differences. in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc) 2.
1 All estimations are Arellano Bond in first differences. Observations  244  244  244  244  244  244  244  244  Number of countries  40  40  40  40  40  40  40 40 Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1% Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc) 2 1 All estimations are Arellano Bond in first differences. 2 Official debt is the sum of multilateral, bilateral and IMF debt. Multilateral and bilateral include concessionary and non-concessionary debt. 
